Weapons’ Impact Depends on Economic Conditions

Samuel Lee, Ilari Passivirta, and Alexander Zentefis propose a theory linking weapons, wealth, and societal stability. They argue that weapons can deter conflict, but also increase mortality, impacting long-term investment in livelihoods. When potential returns on investment are high, deterrence prevails and peace strengthens.

However, when returns are low, increased mortality discourages future investment. This creates a cycle of violence where life loses value and instability worsens. The researchers apply this theory to four historical cases: Medieval Iceland, Tokugawa Japan, West Africa, and the Comanche.

Their model suggests nuclear deterrence operates on similar logic. It also offers a new perspective on gun violence in impoverished urban areas.

The researchers acknowledge the model doesn't fully explain all instances of violence and stability. Further research will refine the understanding of these complex interactions.